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Abstract. The emergence of inclusive populist parties disputes the social construction of the ‘people’ to the exclusive populism, 
recently generating new academic debates. Do the new radical left parties have a nationalist character? Are populism and nationalism 
two inseparable dimensions? Drawing on an original dataset in Spain, this article shows that Podemos’ supporters are significantly less 
nationalist, expressing more open attitudes towards cultural diversity and immigration, and lower levels of Spanishness than voters 
from other parties. Arguably, Podemos operates as an antagonistic political option to the traditional positions of the populist radical 
right (PRR), building an inclusive imagined community around a type of constitutional patriotism or republican populism. These 
findings contribute to the scholar debate on the relationship of nationalism and populism, bringing to discussion the core values of the 
supporters of a populist party as a complementary element to its categorization.
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[es] Inmigrantes y Patria. La comunidad imaginada de la izquierda radical en España
Resumen. El surgimiento de partidos populistas inclusivos disputa la construcción social del “pueblo” a los populismos excluyentes, 
generando recientemente nuevos debates académicos. ¿Tienen los nuevos partidos de izquierda radicales un carácter nacionalista? 
¿Son el populismo y el nacionalismo dos dimensiones inseparables? Basándose en un conjunto de datos primarios en España, este 
artículo muestra que los votantes de Podemos son significativamente menos nacionalistas, expresando actitudes más abiertas hacia la 
diversidad cultural y la inmigración, así como niveles más bajos de españolidad que los votantes de otros partidos. Podríamos decir 
que Podemos opera como una opción política antagónica a las posiciones tradicionales de la derecha populista radical, construyendo 
en ese antagonismo una comunidad imaginaria inclusiva en torno un tipo de patriotismo constitucional o populismo republicano. Estos 
hallazgos contribuyen al debate académico sobre la relación del nacionalismo y el populismo, trayendo a discusión los valores centrales 
de los partidarios de un partido populista como un elemento complementario a su categorización.
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1. Introduction
We are living in times of strong feelings about the 
position of migration in relation to the nation. Fear and 
uncertainty drive some people towards a political vote 
rejecting migrants and population movements. Against 
the exclusionary politics emerging in European populist 
movements – such as the Spanish Vox, the French Front 
National (National Front), the Belgian Vlaams Belang 
(Flemish Interest), and the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria)– the emergence 
of inclusive social protest movements has allowed for 
the dispute about the social construction of the ‘people’ 
(Žižek, 2016; Mudde & Rovira-Kaltwasser, 2013; 
Lobera & Parejo, 2019).
Public support of the populist radical right (PRR) in 
Europe has increased since the late 1980s. Among 
the generally accepted causes of this increase are 
the growing distrust of political institutions, as well 
as the reaction against the changes generated by 
globalization, both economic (Betz, 1993; Swank & 
Betz, 2003) and cultural (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). 
There is, however, a lack of evidence on the link 
between the electoral support for inclusive populist 
parties, such as Podemos or Syriza, and their new 
conceptions of the nation and citizenship. 
The new conceptions of the nation come into 
direct antagonistic competition with the ethnic logic 
of the nation exposed in the narrative of the PRR. 
Inclusive left-wing parties typically “emphasize 
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egalitarianism and inclusivity rather than the openly 
exclusivist anti-immigrant or anti-foreigner concerns 
of right-populism (i.e. its concern is the demos not 
the ethnos)” (March, 2012, p. 122). To identify the 
voting factors for Podemos, we will test the common 
hypotheses of voting for far-right parties to see if 
they are significant in an opposite direction or if, on 
the contrary, they are not differentiating the vote for 
Podemos.
This article provides evidence on the key 
political values and attitudes to analyze the level 
of nationalism and the type of populism among the 
voters of Podemos. This study concludes that, in 
the case of Podemos, populism and nationalism are 
manifested in separate and even opposite dimensions, 
at least in the most common conceptualization of 
nationalism based on a “natural” conception of the 
nation. I argue that terms of constitutional patriotism 
or republican populism might be better fits for the case 
of Podemos’s discourse, than the category of populist 
nationalism. A second contribution of this article is 
focused on perspective. Instead of the analysis of the 
elites’ discourse or an analysis of strategy, I propose 
the analysis of voter values as a complementary 
element to discuss some of the previous analyzes.
2. Theoretical framework
The debate is vibrant. Are the new radical left parties 
nationalist? The scholarly analysis on two types of 
populisms (e.g. Mudde & Rovira-Kaltwasser, 2013), 
one exclusive and nationalist on the right (such as Vox, 
Front National, UKIP), and another inclusive on the 
left (such as Podemos and Syriza), has led to a broader 
conceptual analysis of the relationship of populist and 
nationalist movements, also on the left. Are populism 
and nationalism two inseparable dimensions?
As Custodi and Caiani (2019) point out, both 
lines of reasoning are present in the literature. For 
some, nationalism and populism are two intersecting 
phenomena that are not analytically distinct (Brubaker, 
2019). This position appeared implicitly in the large 
scholarship on Europe’s populist radical right (PRR), 
where the two terms are often combined, and xenophobic 
nationalism becomes a ‘primary connotation’ of popu- 
lism itself (Brubaker 2019, p. 2). In the recent scholarly 
debate, Brubaker is hesitant to accept a simplified, 
one-dimensional concept of populism. In his opinion, 
populism cannot be understood solely by vertical claim-
making along an up-down axis, since the invocation of 
the populism-typical ‘the people’ occurs along lines of 
both vertical and horizontal exclusions.
On the other hand, De Cleen and Stavrakakis 
(2017; 2020) argue that nationalism and populism 
are significantly different and analytically separate 
manifestations. Even if both refer to ‘the people’, 
populism operates on an upward axis (‘people as 
underdog’), while nationalism operates on a distinct 
inward axis (‘people as nation’) (De Cleen et al., 
2019). Although the two axes may co-exist, one 
always prevails, relegating the other to the periphery 
of the actor’s discourse. Consequently, right-wing 
populist actors are reported as primarily nationalist, 
whereas left-wing populist actors are reported as 
primarily populist, although this remains subject to 
further empirical analysis (Stavrakakis et al., 2017).
Additionally, there is also a discussion about a 
more adequate approach to analyze populist parties, 
particularly between approach based on the analysis 
of their ideational dimension (e.g., Mudde and Rovira 
Kaltwasser, 2017) and another based on their strategies 
(e.g, De Cleen, 2017; De Cleen et al., 2019; Custodi 
and Caiani, 2019). The main criticism of the ideational 
analysis is the risk “to hinder the full accounting for 
outcomes that are dependent in part on agency and 
action” (Barr, 2018, p. 53). On the other hand, the 
strategy-centered analysis may be affected by the 
difficulty of interpreting the ideological discourses in the 
symbolic-cultural context of the voters themselves, to 
whom the populist mobilization discourse is addressed.
Thus, the research question that leads this study is: 
are the voting bases of all populist parties nationalist? 
Specifically, I will analyze a case on which several 
studies have been conducted in recent years, the case 
of Podemos in Spain. To address this question, I review 
the main theories that explain the vote to nationalist 
populist parties to establish hypotheses about our case 
of study. The starting hypothesis is that, in the case of 
Podemos, populism is not associated with a nationalist 
mobilization. From this, the specific hypotheses on the 
voters of Podemos will arise.
Competition is a widespread approach of explaining 
the vote for PRR parties. Anchored in the more classical 
bases of the social sciences, a common assumption is that 
individuals pursue their own interest in the formation of 
their political opinions (Key, 1961; Campbell et al., 1960; 
Malchow-Møller et al., 2008). From this point of view, 
competition in the labor market or for public resources 
are key factors in the formation of attitudes. The far-right 
parties frequently frame hostility towards immigrants 
in economic terms, arguing that “immigrants not only 
burden social services with new expenditures, but they 
also take away scarce jobs from the native unemployed” 
(Betz, 1993, p. 416). Thus, we expect:
 H1: a higher vote for Podemos among those 
less exposed to negative effects of globalization 
on work and employment: those with college 
education and higher household income.
 H2: a lower vote for Podemos among those 
believing that Public Health is negatively affected 
by migrants.
In this vein, another common narrative in the 
PRR is preferentialism (De Orellana and Michelsen, 
2019). Particularly, these parties oppose ethnic versus 
civic acquisition rules, including normatively over-
inclusion of co-ethnics and exclusion of individuals 
who do not belong to the national majority (Pogonyi, 
2017). The principle of national preference is the rule 
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for the set of measures proposed by far-right parties 
since their beginnings, like the Front National:
We demand (…) the suppression of all legislation and 
instructions tending to establish legal equality between 
French people and immigrants and we demand the final 
but gradual return of the immigrants to their countries 
of origin, with the exception of immediate expulsion 
for those whose aggressive behavior, permanent hatred 
and illegal actions are unworthy of French hospitality 
(Taguieff, 1989, p. 48).
Thus, we hypothesize:
 H3: a lower vote for Podemos among those 
expressing preferentialist values.
Additionally, gender can influence partisan 
positions (Duverger, 1955; Inglehart and Norris, 2000). 
In the case of PRR support, there is evidence that points 
to a “populist radical right gender gap” (Campbell & 
Erzeel, 2018, p. 96). One of the most consistent results 
in research of the PRR is that these parties tend to 
receive a disproportionate share of their support from 
men (Betz, 1993; Kitschelt, 1997; Norris, 2005). A 
gender gap in the populist radical left parties is also 
identified in the same direction, but it is considerably 
smaller than it was for the PRR (Spierings & Zaslove, 
2017). Thus, we expect the following hypothesis:
 H4: a lower vote for Podemos among women than 
men.
Cultural theories are also a common explanation 
for the PRR vote. Drawing on surveys conducted in 
31 countries, Inglehart and Norris (2016) argued that 
an important structural factor is a reactionary cultural 
movement (cultural backlash), especially in older 
generations, white men, and less qualified, previously 
dominant sectors, and that they resist losing its status 
in the face of the advancement of cultural diversity 
and the cosmopolitan values  of open societies and 
globalization. Those groups would be particularly 
vulnerable to the call of right-wing populists.
The analytical distinction between socio-
economic factors and the artificial cultural reaction 
does not imply opposition. As Inglehart and Norris 
(2016, p. 3) point out, structural changes in the labor 
force and social trends in globalized markets may 
raise economic insecurity, and this, to in turn, it may 
stimulate a negative reaction among traditionalists 
towards cultural changes. In short, both dynamics 
and their interaction are necessary to explain the 
growing social unrest and citizen disaffection towards 
democracy and traditional parties (Sanahuja, 2017). 
Thus, we hypothesize:
 H5: a lower vote to Podemos among those 
expressing assimilationist values.
On the other hand, hostility toward refugees have 
often been present in the political discourses of the 
PRR (Wodak et al., 2013; Betz, 2017). Thus, we 
hypothesize:
 H6: a lower vote for Podemos among those 
expressing anti-refugees attitudes.
Finally, speeches about the nation are a central 
message in the PRR. In the particular case of 
Spain, the concept of nation and national sentiment 
have been strongly influenced by recent history, 
particularly by Franco’s nationalist dictatorship 
between 1939 and 1975. That is why we expect the 
feeling of Spanishness to be less present in the voters 
of the radical leftist party. Thus, we hypothesize:
 H7: a lower vote for Podemos among those 
expressing higher levels of feeling of belonging to 
Spain.
3. Case selection rationale and method
The case of superdiverse areas in Spain is analytically 
useful for several reasons. First, Spain provides a 
context of deep changes in the political party system 
(Lobera, 2015) as well as in the influx of immigration, 
after an extraordinary “immigration boom” that 
brought the share of the foreign-born from near 4% of 
the total population to around 14% in less than a decade 
(Arango, 2018, p. 510). Secondly, superdiverse areas are 
more sensitive to exclusionary right-wing discourses, 
since a greater proportion of their population expresses 
xenophobic views than in non-superdiverse areas 
(Giménez et al., 2015). Thirdly, the severe financial and 
economic crisis has greatly impacted Spain since 2008, 
boosting unemployment from 8% to 27%, exceeding 
50% among immigrants and young people, and resulting 
in a reversal of migration trends.
I use data collected from 7,976 face-to-face 
structured interviews (1,123 of which are supporters of 
Podemos) carried out from October 2nd to 17th, 2017, 
on native people who were 18 years of age or older 
and lived in 24 highly-diverse territories in Spain (see 
Appendix 1). The general characteristics of super-
diversity identified by Vertovec (2006, 2007) in certain 
contexts in Britain appear in a similar fashion in these 
territories. On average, 29.9% of the population of those 
territories is foreign. Foreign nationalities with the 
greatest presence are Moroccans (15.3%), Romanians 
(10.1%), Ecuadorians (7.3%), and Pakistanis (6.5%). 
Additionally, about 5% of Spaniards living in these 
territories self-identify as Roma.
The dependent variable is built as a dummy 
variable, 1= vote or preference for Podemos (15%; 
n= 1,123); 0= don’t vote or preference for Podemos 
(85%; n= 6,376). As a first step of the analysis, 
we selected the following independent variables 
of sociodemographic character: gender, age, level 
of education, and household income level, as well 
as an indicator of feeling of belonging to Spain. 
In the second regression model, we incorporate 
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all the controls described and used in the previous 
section (competition and cultural variables) to 
isolate the effect that other alternative explanatory 
factors could have on our dependent variables. The 
description of the independent variables is presented 
in Appendices 2 and 3.
4. Findings
The following table shows the results of the binary logistic 
regression model predicting the vote for Podemos (table 
1). This table displays that the main variables tested 
show a significant effect on the dependent variable.
Table 1. Logit on Podemos’ support. Source: our own production.
Model 1 Model 2
B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig.
Gender (1=women) -0.192 0.074 0.010 -0.217 0.076 0.005
Age -0.014 0.002 0.000 -0.009 0.002 0.000
Education level 0.317 0.031 0.000 0.210 0.032 0.000
Household income level 0.054 0.039 0.162 0.010 0.040 0.802
Feeling Spaniard -0.273 0.040 0.000 -0.184 0.042 0.000
Public Health negatively affected by migrants: 
Strongly or somewhat agrees (ref.)    0.000
Somewhat disagrees    0.308 0.100 0.002
Strongly disagrees    0.776 0.099 0.000
Preferentialism    -0.458 0.086 0.000
Refugees not welcome    -0.525 0.083 0.000
Assimilationism    -0.273 0.121 0.024
Constant -3.032 0.283 0.000 -1.542 0.339 0.000
Nagelkerke R Square 0.087   0.158   
Model 1 shows that sociodemographic indicators 
(gender, age, education level) and feeling of belonging 
to Spain have a moderate effect (0.021 > R2> 0.13), 
following Cohen’s criteria to value the effect size of 
the adjusted R2 (Cohen, 1988). As presented in Table 
1, individuals with higher educational levels show a 
higher support for Podemos. Nevertheless, the income 
level shows no significant effect (p>.05). Additionally, 
individuals expressing higher levels of feeling of 
belonging to Spain are less likely to support Podemos.
In the second Model, attitudinal variables related 
to immigration improve, significantly, the goodness 
of fit of the model (R2= 0.158). In sum, the following 
hypotheses are supported:
 H1 (only partially): a higher vote for Podemos among 
those with higher educational levels (b= 0.210; 
p=.000), but no significant differences are observed 
that are linked to the household income level.
 H2: a lower vote for Podemos among those believing 
that Public Health is negatively affected by migrants 
(b = 0.308; p=.002; b=0.776; p=.000).
 H3: a lower vote for Podemos among those 
expressing preferentialist values (b=-0.458; 
p=.000).
 H4: a lower vote for Podemos among women (b=-
0.217; p=.005).
 H5: a lower vote for Podemos among those expressing 
assimilationist values. (b=-0.273; p=.024).
 H6: a lower vote for Podemos among those expressing 
anti-refugees attitudes (b=-0.525; p=.000).
 H7: a lower vote for Podemos among those 
expressing higher levels of feeling of belonging 
to Spain (b=-0.184; p=.000).
5. Discussion
These findings can be discussed in the light of 
previous theories. Firstly, the results presented 
above confirm that the Podemos’s voters present 
antagonistic positions regarding the core values of 
nationalist populist parties. These results support the 
idea that Podemos populism presents an inclusive 
character (Mudde & Rovira-Kaltwasser 2013), as 
opposed to nationalist preferentialism, such as Vox.
These results qualify previous arguments by 
showing that Podemos, despite adopting populist 
strategies, does not incorporate horizontal exclusionary 
elements (Brubaker, 2019), as is consistently the case 
with PRR. The data presented for the Spanish case 
contradict the existence of an intrinsic horizontal in/
out dimension of populism proposed by Brubake 
(2019, p. 13), referring to the exclusion of groups “at 
the margins (defined by culture, lifestyle, or gender/
sexual identity, not by wealth, power, etc.)” as well 
as “those on the bottom, represented also as different 
(ethnoracially, culturally or morally)”.
These attitudes of the voters of Podemos are in 
line with the inclusive statements of their leaders –e.g. 
Pablo Iglesias declared, “those immigrant workers, 
nobody has the right to call you foreigners in Spain” 
(Iglesias, 2015, p. 184), underlining the vertical axis as 
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fundamental and unique in its confrontational approach. 
In addition, the results show that Podemos voters show 
a lower level of feeling “Spanish” than the rest of the 
population. This data is in line with a political position 
of Podemos with respect to the Spanish nation: it is 
the only party operating nationwide that defends the 
Catalan self-determination referendum. Nor is here 
a horizontal exclusion with the minority national 
feelings present in Spain (e.g. Catalan, Basque, and 
Galician, among others).
All these results are in line with the theoretical 
distinction between populism and nationalism defended 
by De Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017; 2020). These results 
do not exclude the existence of interactions between 
nationalism and populism in the case of Podemos, but 
they show the nationalist pulse in this party is lower 
than in general population in Spain –and, on certain 
issues, even showing an anti-nationalist character. 
This implies the necessity to analyze separately the 
nationalist character of populist parties (and vice versa), 
as proposed by these authors.
Also, the findings support some of the hypotheses 
raised by Custodi and Caiani (2019) pointing to a 
counterhegemonic character of the national discourse 
of Podemos. New debates should be addressed about 
the nature of nationalism and whether a party that 
does not mention the expression “We are a nation” 
or even reference “the Spanish nation” can still be 
considered as a nationalist party. In this regard, it can 
be argued that the new imagined community raised 
by Podemos cannot be labelled as nationalist without 
an electoral base expressing nationalist values or 
without references to the natural character of Spain 
or to the very same term of nation.
On the contrary, the use of the term patria that 
Podemos poses is denatured, built by the class struggle, 
as a space of rights and duties (Iglesias, 2015). In this 
sense, the patriotism of Podemos might be seen as a 
type of republican or constitutional patriotism (Lobera, 
2019a)2. As noted by García-Agustín (2018, p. 164), 
Podemos has offered an alternative to nationalism and to 
a populist reduction of the political community. Indeed, 
this party has advanced to “a republican populism in 
which patria is related to both the institutions and the 
people” (Íbid.).
Although the Podemos electorate is significantly 
less nationalist, preferentialist and assimilationist than 
the rest of the parties, this electorate is not homogeneous 
(as it is none). In this sense, a minority part of Podemos’ 
voters present preferential and assimilationist attitudes. 
The additional evidence presented in Appendix 4 
shows that individuals with lower levels of educational 
2 Constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus) is based 
on an identification of a reflexive nature not with particular 
contents of a particular cultural tradition, but with universal 
contents included in the normative order sanctioned by the 
constitution: human rights and the fundamental principles of 
the democratic rule of law (cf. Habermas 1989: 94). Republi-
can patriotism is “explicitly particularistic” and grounded in 
“the citizens’ passionate love of their republic’s institutions 
and way of life” (Viroli, 2002, p. 14).
attainment (b=–.349; p=.000) and higher levels of 
Spanishness (b=.291; p=.000) might be more attracted 
by preferentialist discourses. Hence the need for a 
left-wing populist movement to strategically offer an 
alternative imagined community to the nation-based 
one to bring together left-wing voters.
The construction of a non-nationalist imagined 
community has a long tradition on the left. Arguably, 
this construction is even inseparable from the leftist 
movements themselves. Common expressions as “the 
people united will never be defeated” may reflect the 
need for unity within a collective that is strategical-
ly homogenized in the Marxist readings of society 
(e.g. Lukács, 2009 [1924]). Populist left-wing parties 
represent a working class without differences, as the 
99% against the “casta”, the establishment (Jerez et 
al., 2015), constituting a “emancipatory” imagined 
community against the “natural” idea of nation used 
traditionally by the elites in order to divide the prole-
tariat (Luxemburg, 1976 [1907]).
Since the Second International (1889-1916), the 
choice between an internationalist approach or the 
struggle within the existing nation-state structures 
has been conflicting on the left. Nevertheless, as 
Worth (2019, p. 1062) notes, most often “the nation-
state remains the prime location for socialism to be 
built, through the premise of popular democracy and 
sovereignty”. In the case of the new radical leftist 
parties, more research is needed to actualize this 
debate, since we can find rhetoric in both directions. 
In any case, it is doubtful that the election of a nation-
state framework can be used as an indicator of left-
wing nationalism.
De Cleen interestingly suggests analyzing whether 
the use of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995) can serve as an 
indicator of the nationalist character of leftist populism. 
This opens an interesting debate, since nationalism 
is so banalized that it daily permeates different levels 
of society. Arguably, banal nationalism would be a 
necessary but not sufficient condition to grant the status 
of nationalist to a political party; otherwise, one might 
find that all parties operating nationwide are nationalist, 
losing the analytical utility of this category.
The observations made by Custodi and Caiani 
(2019) about the use of the term patria by Podemos 
are very relevant. The results presented in this article 
partially confirm their conclusions about a counter-
hegemonic discourse in Podemos, although qualifying 
the nationalist category they use. The counter-
hegemonic (non-)nationalist and inclusive character 
of Podemos’ populism can be further analyzed in the 
context of the electoral crystallization of the 15M 
protests that took place in Spain between 2011-2013 
(see, for example, Sampedro & Lobera, 2014; Lobera 
& Rogero, 2017; Lobera, 2019b).
Generally, the term patria has been almost exclusively 
used by right-wing parties, particularly in Spain as a result 
of the country’s long history of authoritarian nationalist 
rule. Podemos introduces a substantial change in the 
political culture of the Spanish left mentioning the word 
“Spain”, as a patria, eliminating its character as a nation 
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and replacing it with a type of constitutional patriotism 
focused on social conquests, in line with the social 
demands raised by the 15M movement. In this vein, the 
populist dimension of the use of patria is reflected in 
Podemos’ idea “my patria is the people” (mi patria es 
la gente). This slogan was used by the party in social 
media, particularly during the Spanish national holiday 
in 2016, denouncing cuts in health, education, housing 
or dependency.
6. Conclusions
Can be the words “Spain” or “patria” be mentioned 
without a nationalist dimension by a populist party? 
In this article I discuss the results of the analysis of 
the values of the voters of Podemos in superdiverse 
areas. The analysis performed confirms that Podemos’ 
inclusive discourse is reflected in the base of its 
electorate. Podemos’ supporters are more likely to 
express inclusive attitudes towards ethnic diversity and 
immigration than the rest of voters.
In this article, I argued the condition of Podemos 
is an antagonistic political option to PRR positions. 
Spanish voters on the radical left and the radical 
right have incompatible beliefs about migrants, 
cultural diversity and feeling of belonging to Spain, 
and largely define themselves in opposition to one 
another.
As Lamont and Molnar (2002) stress, symbolic 
boundaries are not only employed to maintain social 
boundaries, but also to contest and reframe their meaning. 
In this vein, Podemos reframed the term Patria without 
horizontal symbolic boundaries, but with a critical 
vertical problematization, rivaling the ethnic nation as a 
producer of symbolic boundaries (e.g. Verdery, 1994). 
More research is desirable on how symbolic boundaries 
are drawn (both vertically and horizontally) across 
ideological spectrum, particularly among voters of 
radical right and radical left parties. This line of research 
can shed light on the ambiguous appeals to ‘the people’ in 
populist and nationalist discourses.
This study has several limitations that must be 
considered. The current political organization centered in 
the nation states implies a high degree of contextualization 
in the social construction of the meanings of the nation 
and country, particularly among the political left. Thus, 
the conclusions of this study should not be extrapolated 
to other countries, but integrated into a comparative 
discussion.
There is still a wide debate about the adaptation 
to Podemos of the different models of constitutional 
patriotism (Habermas, 1989; Fossum, 2001; Calhoun, 
2002), critical or civic patriotism (Laborde, 2008), 
republican patriotism (Viroli, 2002) or republican 
populism (García-Agustín, 2018). Further analysis 
of the attitudes of its voters can contribute to this 
debate, in addition to the discursive analysis of its 
political elites. As noted by Barr (2018), consensus-
making is central for understanding what populism 
is. The present study is oriented from the analysis 
of the core values of the electoral bases of the party, 
around which consensus can be built. In this sense, 
a national survey will offer new perspectives to 
these conclusions and will be exploited in future 
articles to confirm or refute some of the conclusions 
presented here.
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9. Appendices
Appendix 1. Source: our own production.
Area Region Population Interviews
Blas Infante and Las Colombinas, Lepe (Huelva) Andalusia 26,931 326
Distrito Norte Polígono, Granada (Granada) Andalusia 25,867 341
Las Norias de Daza, El Ejido (Almería) Andalusia 9,206 283
Palma-Palmilla, Málaga (Málaga) Andalusia 30,767 390
Zona Sur, Jerez de la Frontera (Cádiz) Andalusia 32,679 350
Casco Histórico, Zaragoza (Zaragoza) Aragon 46,015 301
San Francisco and Zabala, Bilbao (Vizcaya) Bask Country 11,827 362
Playa Honda, San Bartolomé (Lanzarote, Las Palmas) Canary Islands 18,249 302
Teguise (Lanzarote, Las Palmas) Canary Islands 21,886 303
Daimiel (Ciudad Real) Castile La Mancha 18,176 322
Sigüenza (Guadalajara) Castile La Mancha 4,496 321
El Clot, Barcelona (Barcelona) Catalonia 27,039 314
El Raval de Ciutat Vella, Barcelona (Barcelona) Catalonia 47,608 285
Les Roquetes, Trinitat Nova and Verdum, Barcelona 
(Barcelona)
Catalonia 37,926 317
Salt (Girona) Catalonia 29,836 265
Tortosa (Tarragona) Catalonia 33,445 302
Zona Nord de Nou Barris, Barcelona (Barcelona) Catalonia 10,342 312
Madre de Dios and San José, Logroño (La Rioja) La Rioja 38,441 299
Centro, San Nicasio, and Batallas, Leganés (Madrid) Madrid 32,923 338
Las Margaritas, Getafe (Madrid) Madrid 110,717 295
Lavapiés, Madrid (Madrid) Madrid 44,680 318
Pueblo Nuevo, Madrid (Madrid) Madrid 60,570 344
Carrús, Elche (Alicante) Valencian Community 33,702 660
La Coma, Paterna (Valencia) Valencian Community 9,301 326
Blas Infante and Las Colombinas, Lepe (Huelva) Andalusia 26,931 326
Total 662,629 7,976
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Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics of the independent variables. Source: our own production.
Variable Categories and Statistics
Sociodemographics
Gender 0= Men: 49.6%1= Women: 50.4%
Age M= 45.25, SD=17.010
Education level
1= Cannot read, illiterate: 1.0%
2= Without studies, he/she knows how to read: 2.6%
3= Incomplete Primary Education: 6.2%
4= Primary education: 14.5%
5= Lower secondary education: 29.6%
6= Upper secondary education and Post-secondary non-tertiary: 27.4%
7= Short-cycle tertiary education: 9.2%
8= Bachelor degree or higher: 9.5%
Household income level
1= Much higher (more than 2,200 Euros per month): 4.5%
2= Higher: 27.9%
3= Around 1,100 Euros per month: 28.8%
4= Lower: 30.5%
5= Much lower (less than 550 per month): 8.3%
Feeling of belonging
Feeling Spaniard
1= Not at all: 7.4%
2= Very little: 11.6%
3= Some: 25.9% 
4= A lot: 54.3%
DK/NA: 0.8%
Values and attitudes towards immigration
Public Health negatively affected by 
migrants
1 = Strongly or somewhat agrees: 40.2% 
2 = Somewhat disagrees: 24.2% 
3 = Strongly disagrees 24.4% 
DK/NA: 11.3%
Preferentialism
When hiring a person, it is preferred to hire a 
Spaniard rather than an immigrant.
0= Strongly or somewhat disagrees: 48.5% 
1= Strongly or somewhat agrees: 47.1%
DK/NA: 4.4%
Refugees not welcome
0= Accepts refugees to the country: 48.0% 
1= Rejects refugees coming to the country: 44.1%
DK/NA: 7.9%
Assimilationism
If immigrants want to stay here, they must 
forget their customs, learn the language and 
accept the customs of this country.
0= pluralist values: 82.1%  
1= assimilationist values: 17.9%
DK/NA: 2.2%
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Appendix 3. Values of the attitudinal variables among Podemos’ supporters and the rest 
(1= Podemos’ supporters). Source: our own production.
3.1. Assimilationism A3.2. Feeling of belonging to Spain
A3.3. Refugees not welcome A3.4. Preferentialism
Note: T-tests show that the mean differences between the two groups are significant at a 0.01 level.
Appendix 4. Logit on preferentialism among Podemos’ supporters. Source: our own production.
VD= Preferentialism B S.E. Sig.
Gender (1=women) -0.069 0.129 0.594
Age 0.008 0.005 0.094
Education level -0.349 0.053 0.000
Household income level 0.069 0.065 0.285
Feeling Spaniard 0.291 0.072 0.000
Constant -0.057 0.552 0.918
Nagelkerke R Square 0.118
